IAEA estimate as of 13 June 2025; it is not a current measurement.
Iran / Middle EastwatchIran and the IAEA
Iran's enriched-uranium inventory remains unverified as inspection terms stay disputed
The authoritative stockpile figure is a June 2025 baseline, while current quantities, locations, and access remain unresolved.
Signal score78/100substantial evidencemoderate assessment confidence
Updated Aug 3, 2026 UTC4 representative sources2 scored claimsSnapshot—not continuous monitoring
Assessment
What the evidence currently supports
The IAEA's last firm pre-war baseline estimated 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% as of 13 June 2025, of which 432.9 kilograms had been verified. Director General Rafael Grossi said on 24 June 2026 that inspections would occur and modalities were being worked out, while Tehran said access to attacked sites and material depended on a final accord and sanctions relief. No authoritative public confirmation was located by 3 August that comprehensive inspections of the sensitive sites had resumed.
The portion of the 60%-enriched UF6 baseline the IAEA said it had verified.
June inspection statements conflicted, and no later comprehensive-access notice was found.
Change log
What changed
- A June 2026 IAEA report described the agency as unable to inspect war-affected Iranian nuclear facilities.
- On 24 June, Grossi said inspections would take place and technical modalities were being prepared.
- Iran publicly made access to attacked sites and material conditional on a final agreement and practical sanctions relief steps.
Open questions
What remains uncertain
- The 440.9-kilogram figure is a 13 June 2025 baseline and must not be presented as a current measured stockpile.
- Enrichment to 60% does not by itself establish a decision to weaponize or the existence of a nuclear weapon.
- The current location, form, and quantity of sensitive material remain outside verified public knowledge.
Transparent scoring
Why this dossier scores 78
Scores summarize the evidence trail; they do not rate people, predict outcomes, or convert a contested event into a truth number.
Evidence quality35% weight
92
Independent corroboration30% weight
75
Recency20% weight
61
Source diversity15% weight
77
Read the scoring method
Evidence quality weighs source authority and directness; corroboration rewards independent agreement; recency reflects how closely sources track the latest material change; source diversity rewards different institutions, geographies, and source classes. The displayed score is the rounded weighted composite: 35%, 30%, 20%, and 15% respectively.
Full scoring methodology →Claim ledger
Claims, scores, and linked evidence
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01supported97/100
The IAEA's last firm baseline estimated 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% as of 13 June 2025.
The quantity and verification note appear in the IAEA's official safeguards report and are independently reported by AP and Reuters.
This is a historical safeguards baseline, not a present-tense inventory.
02developing36/100
Comprehensive IAEA inspection access to Iran's sensitive, war-affected sites had resumed by 3 August.
Grossi said inspections would happen, but Iran described access as conditional. No authoritative subsequent notice confirming comprehensive resumption was found.
Absence of a public confirmation is not proof that no limited technical contact or site access occurred.
Material developments
Last firm inventory baseline
The IAEA estimated 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60%, with 432.9 kilograms verified in UF6 form.
Inspection gap remains
AP reported that the nuclear watchdog remained unable to inspect facilities affected by the war.
Inspection terms become contested
Grossi said inspections would occur; Iran said access to key sites remained contingent on a final agreement and sanctions relief.
Source ledger
Representative source material
Open each record for the evidence note, short permitted extract, full metadata, scoring, and a direct link to the originating page.
S01GOV/2025/50: Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of IranInternational Atomic Energy Agency · Sep 11, 2025 · primary99Open record
Why it matters
Read full source Authoritative safeguards report providing the dated stockpile baseline, verified portion, and the agency's loss of continuity of knowledge.
S02UN nuclear watchdog says it is unable to work in IranAssociated Press · Jun 4, 2026 · secondary91Open record
Why it matters
Read full source Reports the IAEA's inability to inspect affected facilities and distinguishes the uranium baseline from evidence of an assembled weapon.
S03IAEA chief says Iran inspections will go ahead, working on modalitiesReuters via MarketScreener · Jun 24, 2026 · secondary85Open record
Why it matters
Read full source Syndicated Reuters account juxtaposing Grossi's inspection expectation with Iran's statement that access remained conditional.
S04New talks are 'last chance' for Iran to forge a deal and avoid escalation of US strikes, Trump saysAssociated Press · Aug 3, 2026 · secondary90Open record
Why it matters
Read full source Most recent retrieved report linking the proposed diplomatic sequence to nuclear concerns without reporting renewed comprehensive inspections.
Signal Ledger does not republish full copyrighted articles. Short extracts are included only when useful for evidence inspection; summaries are original, and the source link is the authoritative location for the full material.